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I. Application of international law in the practice 
of courts: duty or optional possibility?
The Hungarian legal system follows the dualist approach with trans-
formation regarding the international treaties and certain decisions of 
international courts and other treaty bodies (hereinafter: treaties). The 
treaties are applicable after transformation, i.e. if they are promulgated 
and published in a Hungarian legal instrument (act of Parliament or 
decree of the Government).1 Besides, a group of norms called “gener-
ally recognized rules of international law” is a part of the Hungarian legal 
system without any further transformation by general transformation 
ensured by the Basic Law (BL) itself.2 It gives a monist feature to the 
Hungarian legal system, however, the content of the term “generally rec-
ognized rules as international law” covers the peremptory norms of inter-
national law (ius cogens), the general principles and customary interna-
tional law.3 Customary law and general principles take precedence over 
domestic laws, except for the BL and only ius cogens rules can prevail 
even over the BL.4
1 See Act L of 2005 on the procedure regarding international treaties
2 Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993. (X.13.) ABH [1993] 327.
3 Molnár Tamás: Relationship of International Law and the Hungarian Legal System 1985-2005, 
in: Jakab András – Takács Péter – Tatham, Allan F. (eds.): The Transformation of the Hun-
garian Legal Order 1985–2005 Transition to the Rule of Law and Accession to the European 
Union. Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007. 458.
4 For example see Constitutional Court Decision № 4/1997. (I. 22.) ABH [1997] 51; Consti-
tutional Court Decision № 30/1998. (VI. 25.) ABH [1998] 237–238; Molnár 2007, 465; 
BLUTMAN, László: A nemzetközi jog használata az Alkotmány értelmezésénél [Using In-
ternational Law to Interpret the Constitution] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2009/7-8. 304.
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In principle, these categories are mentioned in the BL as sources of 
international law to be applied; however in practice some other forms of 
sources appear as well: the decisions of international judicial organs and 
that of international organizations.
By the force of the constitution or by transformation, “[i]n order to 
comply with its obligations under international law, Hungary shall ensure 
that Hungarian law be in conformity with international law”5. The Con-
stitutional Court has competence to decide whether the incorporation 
of an international norm was constitutional,6 and ensure the harmony of 
the domestic and international law but the aim of the present paper is to 
highlight the role of international law in the legal practice.
It derives from constitutional obligation to ensure harmony thus 
any international norm implemented in domestic law shall appear by 
incorporating provisions in domestic law, in the hierarchy of norms. 
The Constitutional Court has a leading role in ensuring the harmony 
of domestic legislation and assumed international obligations due to its 
powers but the application of the sources of international law in the le-
gal practice is a different aspect of harmony. Courts apply the iura novit 
curia principle, i.e. they are presumed to be aware of the content of every 
norm in the entire legal system – including the rules of international law 
but is the judge obliged to search for, invoke and apply the alleged inter-
national regulation binding on Hungary in every single case or can the 
judge trust the domestic legislation which is in fact already in harmony 
with international obligations? Is the judge obliged to know that a cer-
tain legal question is also regulated by international obligations and is it 
expected to always verify that, for example, an Act to be applied in the 
case is in total conformity with an international treaty which happens 
to be superior to domestic legislation except for the constitutional provi-
sions? According to some points of view the judge is not obliged to do 
so, it is the duty of the legislator to elaborate that the international trea-
ty conforms with the legislation and that of the Constitutional Court 
to verify if this legislation is in harmony to the assumed international 
obligations of Hungary.7
It is even more problematic in the question of legal practice related 
to treaty based provisions which are continuously interpreted by a judi-
cial organ explicitly established for disputes arising from the convention 
5 The Basic Law of Hungary (25 April 2011), Art. Q (2), see also Constitutional Court Decision 
№ 7/2005. (III.31.) ABH [2005] 99-101.
6 See Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, Arts. 23 (3)-(4); 24-25; 32.
7 See Csongrád County Court Decision № 14.K.21.445/2009/5. 
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itself. Certainly, the decision settling litigation is only binding for the 
parties; however the legal reasoning and the exploration of the content 
of a provision shall form the part of the convention itself.
Is the Hungarian judge obliged to follow the practice of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights [hereinafter: ECtHR] whether it devel-
ops the provisions of European Convention on Human Rights [here-
inafter: ECHR]8 in a way that is different from the actual Hungarian 
legal practice or is it the task only for the legislative power to keep the 
legislation updated?
Article 13 (1) of Act L of 2005 on the procedure regarding treaties 
answered the question as it states that “the previous decisions of the organ 
having jurisdiction over the disputes in relation to the treaty shall be consid-
ered in the course of the interpretation of the treaty.”
The Constitutional Court expressis verbis emphasized the same 
thought related to ECtHR decisions when it expressed that obligation 
issues from the principle of pacta sunt servanda are to follow the Stras-
bourg practice and its level of fundamental rights protection.9
Legal acts shall be in compliance with the obligations stemming 
from international and Union law.10 Hereby, it has to be noted that EU 
law is regarded as a separate legal system since the accession and it is 
governed by the principle of direct applicability and supremacy rules.11
The Constitutional Court declared that domestic law shall be made 
and interpreted in the view of international obligations no matter if the 
obligation issues from customary international law or incorporated in 
treaty.12 Using international law as an interpretational tool is based on 
Article Q(2) of the Basic Law as regards binding sources. The prob-
lem arises in connection with non-binding sources of international law; 
however, the Constitutional Court noted that invoking them would 
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], Rome, 
4 September 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
9 Constitutional Court Decision № 61/2011. (VII.13) Magyar Közlöny, 2011/80. 23046.
10 Article 2(4) (c) of Act CXXX of 2010 on legislation
11 Blutman László: Milyen mértékben nemzetközi jog az Európai Unió joga a magyar alkotmányos 
gyakorlatban? [To What Extent EU Law is Considered International Law in the Hungarian 
Constitutional Practice], in: Kovács, Péter (ed.): International Law – a quiet strength / Le droit 
international, une force tranquille (Miscellanea in memoriam Géza Herczegh). Pázmány Press, 
Budapest, 2011. 485-297.
12 Constitutional Court Decision № 4/1997. (I.22.) ABH [1997] 41, 48-49.; Constitutional 
Court Decision № 380/B/2004. ABH [2007] 2438, Constitutional Court Decision № 
61/2011. (VII.13.) ABH [2011] 320; Blutman László: A nemzetközi jog használata az Alkot-




help the positivist foundation of argumentation.13 Blutman says that due 
to its independence, the Constitutional Court is free to choose its tools 
for the argumentation and interpretation. Only the validity, casualty 
and verifiability of conclusions form a limitation to the interpretation.14 
The aim is to elaborate a politically and ideologically neutral judgment. 
It can easily be achieved by considering the (non-binding) decisions of 
international organizations and interpretative solutions of judgments of 
third States courts.15
Obligation derived from BL means that the Hungarian State takes 
part in the community of nations and this participation is a constitu-
tional order for domestic law.16 The basis of international cooperation 
is formed by common principles and goals which are subtly affected 
by non-binding norms and expectations to ensure the peace and well-
functioning of interactions. The State can avoid many of these norms 
but it cannot extricate herself from the whole system as it would mean 
isolation from the community.17 Participation in the community of na-
tions thus presumes the application of international norms containing 
social and moral standards as instruments for interpretation. This way 
the citation of non-binding international documents and foreign juris-
prudence as a tool for interpretation of BL can be justified.18
According to Blutman, the main question is whether the BL cre-
ates the obligation to use or at least consider the application of these 
instruments as well. In his view the obligation of participation in inter-
national cooperation cannot transform those norms that are not un-
dertaken explicitly by Hungary as it would be contrary to the principle 
of rule of law, legal certainty and the content of Article 7(1) as well. 
13 Concurring opinion of Péter Kovács in Constitutional Court Decision № 41/2005. (X.27.) 
ABH [2005] 459; Blutman 2009, 302-303.
14 Concurring opinion of László Sólyom in Constitutional Court Decision № 23/1990. (X.31.) 
ABH [1990] 88, See Bragyova, András: Az alkotmánybíráskodás elmélete [The Theory of 
Constitutional Jurisprudence]. KJK – MTA, Budapest, 1994. 171; Kis János: Az első magyar 
Alkotmánybíróság értelmezési gyakorlata [The Practice of Interpretation of the first Hungarian 
Constitutional Court], in: A megtalált Alkotmány? INDOK, Budapest, 2000. 49; Blutman 
2009, 303.
15 Constitutional Court Decision № 21/1996. (V. 17.) ABH [1996] 74. Sólyom László: Az em-
beri jogok az Alkotmánybíróság újabb gyakorlatában [Human Rights in the Recent Practice of the 
Constitutional Court]. Világosság 1993/1. 17-19, 28. Blutman 2009, 303.
16 Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993. (X.13.) ABH [1993] 323; Constitutional Court 
Decision № 15/2004. (V. 14.) ABH [2004] 269.
17 Blutman 2009, 303.
18 Blutman 2009, 304.
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However, non-binding norms might be taken into consideration for in-
terpretation of norms that oblige the State.19
II. The role of international law in the practice of 
courts: what is the effect of invoking international 
legal norms in the reasoning of a judgment?
Three categories can be established to show the significance of the in-
voked international legal norm on the reasoning of a judgment. 
International law has constitutive effect on the reasoning when it 
serves the basis for the judgment. For example in the preliminary (ex 
ante) norm control case of the Law on Procedures Concerning Certain 
Crimes Committed during the 1956 Revolution the Constitutional Court 
invoked customary international law to support the constitutionality of 
the non-application of statutory limitation in certain war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The aim of the legislation was to make pos-
sible some form of ‘historical justice’ in order to prosecute Communist 
offenders for crimes against humanity. The committed crimes had hap-
pened decades before the adoption of this statute and thus it seemed to 
be contrary to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena 
sine lege which are basic principles of law incorporated not just in the 
Constitution but in international treaties to which Hungary had already 
been a party at that time.20 The constitutionality of the provision re-
ferring to war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined by the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, was 
upheld. The Constitutional Court cited the New York Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity of 1968 which declares that no statutory limitation 
shall apply to several categories of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity irrespective of the date of their commission.21 By signing and 
ratifying this convention, Hungary undertook an obligation not to 
apply its own statute of limitations in cases involving war crimes and 
19 See concurring opinion of Péter Kovács in Decision № 45/2005. (XII.14.) ABH [2005] 569. 
Blutman 2009, 304.
20 See Article 7 of ECHR and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights [ICCPR]. 19 December 1966, New York, 999 UNTS. 171.
21 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity. 26 November 1968, New York, 754 UNTS 73. [hereinafter: 1968 New 
York Convention] Article II.
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crimes against humanity.22 The Constitutional Court even highlighted 
the fact that the possibility of ignoring the principles of nullum crimen 
and nulla poena sine lege in the case of certain crimes committed during 
the communist era is based on customary international law thus the 
non-applicability of statutory limitations obliges Hungary without any 
conventional provisions.23
International law has additional constitutive effect when the inter-
national norm plays supplementary role in the reasoning with other 
national legislative acts in the same line, thus both the domestic and 
the international norm have significant effect. For example in 1990 the 
capital punishment was declared to be unconstitutional as it conflicted 
with the constitutional prohibition against any limitation on the essen-
tial content of the right to life and to human dignity. The content of this 
provision of the Constitution was interpreted by international obliga-
tions of Hungary incorporated in the relevant articles of the ICCPR24 
and the ECHR with its Protocol no. 6. dealing with the right to life.25 
As conclusion, capital punishment conflicts with provisions that declare 
that human life and human dignity form an inseparable unit, thus as 
having a greater value than other rights; and thus being an indivisible, 
absolute fundamental right limiting the punitive powers of the State. 
The above mentioned international norms clarified the provisions of the 
Constitution in the view of international obligations, thus they had a 
significant role in the final reasoning of the decision, but primarily it 
was based on the Constitution.26 
International law has supportive effect in those cases whereby the 
reference to international legal instruments is to strengthen a decision 
based on domestic law. Recommendations of the Council of Europe are 
frequently invoked as relevant interpretation of the provisions of the 
ECHR. The Constitutional Court relies many times on these sources 
22 See 1968 New York Convention, Article III-IV.
23 Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993. (X.13.) ABH [1993] 323-338.
24 Article 6.1. of ICCPR declares that every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life. Paragraph 6 of 
the same article states that nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the 
abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.
25 While Article 2.1 ECHR, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, recognized the legitimacy of 
capital punishment, Article 1 Protocol 6 ECHR adopted on 28 April 1983 provides that the 
death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed. Also, 
Article 22 of the Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 
by the European Parliament on 12 April 1989, declares the abolition of capital punishment. 
Constitutional Court Decision № 23/1990. (X.31.) ABH [1990] 102-103.
26 Constitutional Court Decision № 23/1990. (X.31.) ABH [1990] 94-145.
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as guidance for the judgments and decisions of international judicial 
organs to support argumentation or to justify that the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court echoing in the reasoning is in accordance with 
international standards, with international obligations; thus recommen-
dations are not constitutive sources of obligation.
III. The practice of application of different 
sources of international law
Below, the most commonly cited types of international norms are taken 
into account and the role they play in the reasoning is presented. Their 
succession expresses the frequency of their invocation.
1. Treaties as expressis verbis assumed obligations 
It is a constitutional duty to incorporate treaties in domestic law; however 
there are cases that treaty based obligations are invoked beside domestic 
legislation. It rarely means that the assumed international obligation is not 
transformed into Hungarian law and domestic legislation is not in confor-
mity with international ones. Treaties are often invoked to support reason-
ing based on domestic norms but it is quite rare that they have definitive 
or complementary effect on the reasoning. Moreover, when a treaty is a 
significant source of law it is usually accompanied by judicial decisions or 
decisions of the international organ that elaborated the convention. In 
such cases these international legal instruments serve as guidance for the 
interpretation of the cited provisions of the treaty.27 
Due to its function, in the practice of the Constitutional Court the 
most frequently cited treaty is the ECHR as the level of the fundamental 
rights protection provided by the Constitutional Court in no case may 
be lower than the level of international protection. It follows from the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda that the Constitutional Court shall accept 
27 See Constitutional Court Decision № 166/2011. (XII.20.) AB, ABH [2011] 545, 557. The 
interpretation of an international treaty shall coincide with the official interpretation given 
by the organ established or authorized for this purpose. The Constitutional Court explained 
this point of view related to the documents of the Council of Europe in Constitutional Court 
Decision № 41/2012. (XII.6.) Magyar Közlöny 163/2012. 27392.
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and apply the case law of the ECtHR even if it were not derived from its 
own previous practice.28
As for the practice of ordinary courts, the ECHR provisions together 
with the case law of ECtHR are also invoked, mainly with supportive 
effect. 
The other types of cases that reveal the application of international 
law contains a foreign element. In such questions international law has 
a significant role in the reasoning of the judgment, definitive or at least 
complementary. These cases are related to double taxation,29 the calcula-
tion of social allowances like old age pension30 for those who lived a part 
of their life abroad – in a non-EU member State or before the accession of 
Hungary –, and for the most of the time litigation concerning the carriage 
of goods thus it has to be noted that beyond the human rights related 
issues, the most frequently cited international instrument, among other 
bilateral treaties in the subject,31 is the 1956 Geneva Convention on the 
Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR).32
2. Decisions of international judicial organs
The decisions of the ECtHR as well as the decisions of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) are not considered as 
direct sources of international law, they are rather interpretations. In deci-
28 Constitutional Court Decision № 61/2011. (VII.13.) AB, ABH [2011] 290, 321.
29 See for example Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Hun-
gary for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital, 
Barcs, 30 August 1966 (promulgated by Act XVIII of 2000), in: Supreme Court Decision 
Kfv.I.35.460/2007/8 and Bács-Kiskun County Court Decision K.21.858/2006/17.
30 See for example Agreement on social security between the Hungarian Republic and the Re-
public of Austria, 7 September, 1961 (promulgated by Decree-law № 5. of 1962), in: Supreme 
Court Decision MfvK.IV.10.206/2007/4, Budapest Metropolitan Court Decision Mfv/K.
III.11.015/2006/5; Convention between the Hungarian People’s Republic and Federal Re-
public of Germany on social security, 2 May, 1998 (promulgated by Act XXX of 2000), in: 
Győr-Moson-Sopron County Court Decision 9.K.27.302/2007/10.
31 See for example Convention between the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania on the carriage of persons and goods. 
9 February, 1972 (promulgated by Council of Ministers Edict 6/1973. (II.7.), in: Supreme 
Court Decisions Kfv.I.35.063/2007/6 and Kfv.I.35.411/2006/5; Kfv.I.35.107//2007/5. Agree-
ment between the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Government of 
the People’s Republic of Bulgaria on the carriage of persons and goods, Budapest, 17 April 1989 
(promulgated by Decree-law № 3 of 1990), in: Supreme Court Decisions Kfv.I.35.103/2007/7
32 See for example Supreme Court Decisions Kfv.I.35.259/2010/7.; Kfv.V.39.138/2010/7; 
Gfv. X.30.302/2009/4; Gfv.IX.30.095/2010/4; Gfv.X.30.186/2008/6; Gfv.X.30.239/2007/4; 
Gfv.X.30.342/2009/5.
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sion 18/2004. (V.25.) the Constitutional Court declared that the juris-
prudence of the ECtHR forms and obliges the Hungarian practice. This 
kind of obligation refers to the interpretation of the different provisions 
of the Convention and not to the judgment itself.33 Despite this fact the, 
decision in 988/E/2000 highlights that the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice is neither a norm nor a treaty. It decides upon a unique le-
gal dispute even if its statements have theoretical significance and become 
precedent.34 Two years later the new act on the procedure regarding inter-
national treaties was adopted and it reformulates this opinion by stating 
that decisions are binding and shall be executed in Hungary if the state 
is a party to the settled dispute. This decision shall be promulgated with 
the appropriate application of the provisions regarding the promulgation 
of the treaties in the Official Gazette.35 As for the form of promulgation, 
it is the form of the compromis that is determinative. It is to be noted that 
this obligation shall not refer to decisions in litigations when the other 
party to the dispute is a civilian and not a state just like in the case of the 
ECtHR.36 In such cases only Article 13 (1) obliges Hungary to consider 
the decisions of the organ having jurisdiction over the disputes in relation 
to the treaty in the course of the interpretation of it. In this case the deci-
sion is not a source of law; however it can be a significant guidance for 
interpretation of treaty based obligations.37
Regarding the available decisions, ordinary courts, for the most of the 
time, invoke the practice of the ECtHR if the case before them concerns 
fundamental law issues to interpret domestic legal provisions correctly 
mainly in those cases when they are quite ambivalent or seem to be not in 
conformity with international obligations.38 It is not rare that the ECtHR 
practice is invoked as it was discussed and analyzed in a Constitutional 
Court decision, and not the relevant decisions of the ECtHR are cited 
directly,39 or only the ‘practice of the European Court of Human Rights’ is in-
33 Blutman 2009, 310.
34 Constitutional Court Decision № 988/E/2000. ABH [2003] 1290.
35 Article 13 of the Act L of 2005 on the procedure regarding international treaties.
36 See Molnár Tamás: A nemzetközi jogi eredetű normák beépülése a magyar jogrendszerbe [Incor-
poration of international law into the Hungarian legal system], PhD dissertation, ELTE ÁJK, 
manuscript, Budapest, 2012. (Molnár 2012a) 206-210.
37 See Budapest Metropolitan Court Decision 24.K.35.639/2006/25.
38 See Supreme Court Kfv.VI.38.071/2010/4.; Kfv.II.38.073/2010/4.; Kfv.III.38.074/2010/4.; Kfv. 
38075/2010/4.; Bfv.I.1.117/2008/6.; Budapest Regional Court of Appeal  5.Pf.20.738/2009/7. 




voked without any exact decision to support the statement.40 In such cases 
the significance of the invocation is questionable so as its positive effect on 
the reasoning. Such unsupported statement related to the point of view of 
the ECtHR rather weakens than strengthens the legal logic of the deci-
sion. The same problem occurs when imprecisely cited instruments appear 
in the legal reasoning41 or statements are supported by phrases such as 
“according to the practice of the ECtHR” without mentioning at least one 
decision that contains the alleged argument.42
Concerning the legal effect of a decision of an international judicial 
body, recently, the reaction of the legislative power is to be worried about. 
As regards the Fratanoló case43 the Parliament adopted a resolution declar-
ing that the alleged provision of the Hungarian Criminal Code is correct 
and even if the ECHR stated otherwise, the Parliament does not agree 
with the opinion of the ECtHR.44 This attitude of the Parliament does 
not impede ordinary courts to follow the ECtHR decision and on the 
same day of the adoption of the negative declaration of the Parliament, 
the Supreme Court rendered a Strasbourg-conform judgment and re-
lieved the accused on the ground that in a similar case no crime had been 
40 See for example Court of Békés County 5. P. 20259/2008/7.; Budapest Metropolitan Court 
20.Bf.6162/2009/2.
41 See for example the renaming of the International Criminal Court to Tribunal, 10/2009. 
(II.13.) AB határozat. ABH 2009/3., p. 124; 11/2009. (II.13.) AB határozat. ABH 2009/3, 
p. 125; or the different naming of treaties related to the European Union. For example it is a 
common mistake to refer to the Lisbon Treaty when the cited article is definitely belongs to 
the consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union or the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. See this comment in the dissenting opinion of András Bragyova in 
Constitutional Court Decisions № 143/2010. (VII.14.) ABH [2010] 717.
42 For example see Constitutional Court Decisions № 14/2004. (V.7.) ABH [2004] 249-252; 
57/2001. (XII.5.) ABH [2001] 496-498; 10/2007. (III.7.) ABH [2007] 215-217; 154/2008. 
(XII.17.) ABH [2008] 1211-1212; 60/2009. (V.28.) ABH [2009] 523, 97/2009. (X.16.) ABH 
[2009] 876, 30/1998. (VI.25.) ABH [1998] 220.
43 See Fratanoló v. Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, Judgment of 3 November 2011.
44 See Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bíróságának a Fratanoló kontra Magyarország ügyben hozott 
ítélete végrehajtásával kapcsolatos kérdésekről szóló J/6853. számú jelentés (elfogadva az 
Országgyűlés 2012. július 2-i ülésnapján) [Report No. J/6852 of the Parliament on the ex-
ecution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Fratanoló 
v. Hungary, adopted on the session of 2 July, 2012] Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bíróságának a 
Fratanoló kontra Magyarország ügyben hozott ítélete végrehajtásával kapcsolatos kérdésekről 
szóló jelentés elfogadásáról szóló 58/2012. (VII.10.) OGY határozat [Resolution No. 58/2012. 
(VII. 10.) of the Parliament on the execution of the judgment of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights in the case of Fratanoló v. Hungary]. Molnár Tamás: Két kevéssé ismert nemzetközi 
jogforrás helye a belső jogban: a nemzetközi büntetőbíróság döntései, valamint az egyoldalú állami 
aktusok esete a magyar jogrendszerrel [The Place of Two Barely Known International Source of 
Law in Domestic Law: the Case of International Judicial Decisions and Unilateral State Acts 
with the Hungarian Legal System]. Közjogi Szemle, 2012/3. 1. (Molnár 2012b) 3.
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committed in the view of the decision of the ECtHR.45 It is rejoicing that 
the Constitutional Court has already ordered the Parliament to amend 
the Criminal Code and decriminalize the use of red star.46
Concerning the practice of international judicial decisions, the 
ECtHR is the most frequently cited, however, it happens that in the 
reasoning that decisions of the ECHR are cited and invoked which are 
indirectly connected to the case, and sometimes the foreign names of 
these decisions are even misspelled. The famous Babus case of the Re-
gional Court of Appeal is the example of the significance of ECtHR 
judgments in the interpretation and clarification of the Hungarian legal 
practice, and at the same time it serves as an anti-example for the ap-
plication of international law as well: the decoration of reasoning with 
irrelevant and incorrectly cited decisions of the ECtHR.47 In this case 
the application of international judicial decisions is beyond the scope of 
domestic norms. The interpretation and application of the benchmark of 
‘good faith’ established by the ECtHR is far beyond the provisions of the 
Hungarian Criminal Code concerning defamation and libel and the dog-
matic frames and basics. Thus, the applications of ECtHR decisions to 
support the argumentation related to the meaning of bona fides in the case 
of a journalist called Babus directly conflicted with the relevant decision 
of the Constitutional Court [36/1994. (VI.24.)] echoing the Hungarian 
constitutional practice.48
The practice of ordinary courts is confused and confusing at the same 
time. There are examples of the complete rejection of the application of 
ECtHR judgments referred to by the plaintiff for the reason that “the 
Hungarian judiciary does not apply a precedent system of the ECtHR” 49 and 
the invocation and application of the Strasbourg practice with a signifi-
cant effect on the reasoning can also be seen.50
45 Curia Bfv.III.570 2012/2; Molnár 2012b, 3.
46 See Constitutional Court Decision № 4/2013 (II.21.) ABH [2013] 188-211.
47 Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal Decision 3.Bhar.341/2009/6. Koltay András: 
A Fővárosi Ítélőtábla határozata Babus Endre újságíró rágalmazási ügyében [Budapest-Capital 
Regional Court of Appeal Judgment of the Defamation case of the Journalist Endre Babus. 
JeMa, 2010/3. 35.
48 Szomora, Zsolt: Schranken und Schrankenlosigkeit der Meinungsfreiheit in Ungarn, Grundrechts-
beeinflusste Widersprüche im ungarischen Strafrecht. Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechts-
dogmatik, Ausgabe 1/2001. p. 33; Koltay 2013, 36.
49 See for example Decision of Budapest Metropolitan Court 20. Kpk.45.434/2003/2; Pécs Re-
gional Court of Appeal Decision Bfv.III.570/2012/2. Molnár 2012a, 210.
50 See for example Decision of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court of Appeal 5.Pf.20.736/2010/6. 
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3. Decision of international organizations
As regards binding resolutions of international organizations, the BL does 
not contain any provisions; however there are many international orga-
nizations that make binding decisions, the UN Security Council [here-
inafter: SC] is a well-known example of this.51 As for the transformation 
of this latter the Hungarian practice is incoherent, confusing and contra-
dictory. Sometimes they are promulgated by government decrees or regu-
lations and very rarely by acts.52 Sometimes they do not even appear in the 
Hungarian legal system such as many of the resolutions concerning sanc-
tions against Iraq, Angola, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan,53 and it happens 
quite often that they are published in the form of a Foreign Office circular 
(külügyminiszteri tájékoztató). This latter solution is a monist technique 
thus this kind of publication of resolutions is absolutely contrary to the 
provisions concerning Hungarian legal order and legal certainty.54 In le-
gal practice it causes problems in determining the applicable law. For ex-
ample, during the years of Yugoslav disturbances the SC embargoed the 
State. In Hungarian territory, a smuggler was arrested and condemned 
for violation of it but at second instance the judgment was modified and 
he was allowed to go free. In fact the embargo was suspended for a while 
but at the time of the crime it was in force again.55 The former resolution 
suspending the embargo was promulgated late, so at the time of the trial 
of the second instance the judge could only rely on the Foreign Office 
51 There are other international organizations that make binding decisions like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Orga-
nization and some regional fishing organizations. Decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body and Council of ICAO belong to this category, as well as those rare judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) that resolve the disputes of states. Molnár Tamás – Sulyok Gábor – Jakab András: 
Nemzetközi jog és belső jog; jogalkotási törvény [International Law and Domestic Law; Act on 
Legislation], in: Jakab András (ed.): Az Alkotmány kommentárja, I. kötet, Századvég Kiadó, 
Budapest, 2009. 411.
52 Security Council Resolutions and the Hungarian legal system are discussed in details in: Mol-
nár Tamás: Mit kezd a magyar jog az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsának kötelező erejű határozataival? 
(az utóbbiak beépülése és helye a belső jogban) [What does the Hungarian Law do with Binding 
Resolutions of Security Council? (transformation and place of Security Council Resolutions 
in domestic law)], Grotius, 2011. http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=JTIYVQ (accessed 
on: 18.11.2012)
53 UN S/Res. 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1221 (1999) concerning Iraq; UN S/Res. 
1132 (1999) concerning Angola and UN S/Res. 1267 (1999) concerning Sierra Leone.
54 Molnár – Sulyok – Jakab 2009, 412.
55 See UN S/Res. 757 (1992), 760 (1992) and 820 (1993) providing for sanctions against Yu-
goslavia; UN S/Res. 1022 (1995) suspending the embargo and 1074 (1996) providing for the 
embargo again.
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informant providing for the suspension. It resulted that the committed act 
was not qualified at the time of the appellate procedure despite the fact 
that in that time Yugoslavia was embargoed again as the latter resolution 
providing for it was not promulgated in time.56
As for non-binding decisions of international organizations, many 
resolutions and recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Committee of Ministers or the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law – better known as the Venice Commission – are cited to inter-
pret and clarify treaty based obligations thus generally they are invoked in 
the company of treaty articles and ECtHR judgments and for the most 
of the time they are to support the argumentation based on domestic law. 
In these cases the used terms and phrases such as ‘Parliamentary Assembly 
also urges’ or ‘the opinion of the Constitutional Court is in accordance with…’ 
reveals this purpose of citation.57 The same can be said of the decisions of 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the communications 
of the institutions of the EU. For instance when the Constitutional Court 
had to decide upon a case in which the rights of homosexual people were 
concerned, the Court invoked many international instruments to evidence 
the conformity of domestic law with international standards.58
It is rare but unique that these instruments form the integral part of 
the reasoning and the formation of the final decision; however in such 
cases they are always accompanied by treaty based provision and judicial 
practice to replace and complement the lack of constitutional practice re-
lated to fundamental rights.59
Regarding the available decisions, ordinary courts rarely invoke non-
binding instruments of international law and even in these tiny amount 
of cases these instruments are invoked only by referring to Constitutional 
Court decisions that analyses or refer to them therefore there is no prac-
tice of direct citation of non-binding international legal instruments.60
56 Court of Bács Kiskun County I. Bf. 657/1997, BH 1998/409. See Schiffner Imola: Nemzet-
közi jog a magyar bíróságok gyakorlatában [International Law in the Practice of Hungarian 
Courts], Acta Universitatis Szegediensis - Acta Juridica et Politica Publicationes Doctorando-
rum Juridicorum, tom. 4 fasc. 14. (2004) 464-465.
57 For example see, Constitutional Court Decisions № 14/2004. (V.7.) ABH [2004] 249-252; 
57/2001. (XII.5.) ABH [2001] 496-498.; 10/2007. (III.7.) ABH [2007] 215-217; 154/2008. 
(XII.17.) ABH [2008] 1211-1212; 60/2009. (V.28.) ABH [2009] 523., 97/2009. (X.16.) ABH 
[2009] 876, 30/1998. (VI.25.) ABH [1998] 220.
58 See Constitutional Court Decision № 37/2002. (IX.4.) ABH [2002] 240.
59 See Constitutional Court Decisions № 18/2004. (V.25.) ABH [2004] 306, and 40/2005. 
(X.19.) ABH [2005] 446.




4. References to customary international law
The terminology ‘customary international law’ is not used either in the text 
of the Basic Law nor in that of the Constitution, it is covered by the term 
‘generally recognized rules of international law’.61 It is generally transformed 
into the domestic legal system by Article Q (3) of the BL and cannot 
derogate the provisions of the BL. As for general transformation of cus-
tomary international law through the Constitution, Molnár states that 
the reasoning is logically inaccurate: ‘incorporating customary international 
law into the internal legal order with transformation technique is conceptu-
ally impossible, since the domestic legislature has no ‘written customary law’ to 
transpose. A broad inexact norm, which often requires interpretation in inter-
national adjudication to determine its precise content, cannot be transformed.’62 
For instance Article 57 of the Constitution which guarantees the prin-
ciple of nullum crimen sine lege gains its absolute effectiveness through in-
ternational criminal provisions transformed by Article 7 (1).63 According 
to constitutional judge Péter Kovács the question of technical solution 
that transforms international rules can be debated, but the fact that the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda obliges Hungary cannot be questionable.64
Generally, the Constitutional Court refers to customary international 
in the form of its codified version. Sometimes the Constitutional Court 
only adds the information that the cited norm is a generally recognized rule 
of international law but it relies its argumentation on the treaty provision 
that involves the customary international law in question.65 There is no 
sharp separation among the generally recognized rules of international 
law thus, for instance, in decision 32/2008. (III.12.) the principles of nul-
lum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege are declared as fundamental 
principles of international law;66 or the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
referred as ius cogens and customary international law as well.67
The practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court includes only 
a small number of cases in which customary international law appears. 
These cases refer to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the rule 
61 Constitutional Court Decision № 30/1998. (VI.25.) ABH [1998] 220; in decision 823/B/2003 
the Constitutional Court did not share this view.
62 Molnár 2007, 458.
63 Constitutional Court Decision № 2/1994. (I.14.) ABH [1994] 41.
64 Dissenting opinion of Péter Kovács: Constitutional Court Decision № 95/2009. (X.16.) ABH 
[2009] 863.
65 See Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993 (X.13) ABH [1993] 327.
66 Constitutional Court Decision № 32/2008. (III.12.) ABH [2008] 334.
67 Constitutional Court Decision № 4/1997. (I.2.) ABH [1997] 41, 52.
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that war crimes and crimes against humanity shall be punished without 
statutory limitation is declared to be ius cogens. It is to be noted, that the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege also constitutes customary interna-
tional law.68
In decision 53/1993. (X.13.) the Constitutional Court pursued a pre-
liminary norm control69 concerning modification of the Criminal Code 
and its conformity with international norms relating to prescription of 
crimes regulated by common Article 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 
Concerning these kinds of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the 
Constitutional Court derives the legal basis for punishability without time 
limit from the fact that they are considered ius cogens as they threaten the 
whole humankind.
In decision 32/2008. (III.12.), for instance, the argumentation of the 
Constitutional Court concerning criminality of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity prescribed by the universal principle of international 
customary law is declared to be effective in domestic law through the 
provisions of Article 7(1) of the Constitution. Detailed obligation issued 
from this norm is analyzed and interpreted in the view of the principle 
of nullum crimen sine lege which is declared in the ECHR and that of the 
ICCPR but the provision of these conventions contain exceptions which 
allow the retroactive effect of the customary norm of criminality of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. These sources of international law 
means international legal obligations to be taken into account as Article 
57(4) of the Constitution declaring the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
in domestic law does not allow any exceptions.70 
Concerning the practice of ordinary courts only domestic customary 
law is applied except for the nine ‘volley trial cases’.71 The Parliament ad-
68 See Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993 (X.13) ABH [1993] 327.
69 Article 23 of the BL (1) Based on a petition containing an explicit request submitted by an 
authorized person pursuant to Article 6 (2) and (4) of the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court 
shall, in accordance with Article 24 (2) a) of the Basic Law, examine for conformity with the 
Basic Law the provisions of adopted but not yet promulgated Acts referred to in the petition.
70 Constitutional Court Decision № 2/1994. (I. 14.) ABH [1994] 41; 53-54; See analysis of the 
decision: Bodnár László: Igazságtétel – most már kizárólag a nemzetközi jog alapján? [ Justice – 
on the basis of only international law by now?] Acta Universitatis Szegediensis - Acta Juridica et 
Politica, Tom. 53. Fasc. (1998) 6. 77-84.
71 The term refers to the prosecutions of barrages against unarmed civilians but it became used 
in connection with the prosecution of all criminal acts committed in the period of the 1956 
revolution, thus including such crimes as extrajudicial executions. Hoffmann, Tamás: Indi-
vidual Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts - The 
Hungarian Jurisprudence on the 1956 Volley Cases’, in: Manacorda, Stefano - Nieto, Adán 
(eds): Criminal Law Between War and Peace: Justice and Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
142
Erzsébet Csatlós
opted a statute in 1993 on the procedure to follow in case of certain crimes 
committed during the 1956 war of independence and revolution that 
made possible the punishment of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
without statutory limitation. Decision 53/1993. (X.13.) of the Constituti-
onal Court stated that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is not to be 
applied in such cases as the non-application of statutory limitation for the 
above mentioned crimes is the order of international customary law and 
ius cogens.72 Although the Act of 1993 was declared to be unconstitutional 
and annulled in 199673 for other reasons but the volley trials were judged 
in the view of the statements of the 1993 decision of the Constitutional 
Court, thus the courts applied customary international norms while deli-
vering the judgments in these cases.74
IV. Conclusion
The paper aims to present the Hungarian judicial practice in light of the 
application of international law. It makes comparisons between the prac-
tice of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the Basic Law and that 
of ordinary courts that stand for the classical judiciary. The powers and 
functions of both are different and thus their practice is different in the 
application of international law and the significance of these sources of 
law in the reasoning, they also share common features. It is the efficiency 
and effective application of the available international instruments that 
can be questioned as it is a common problem for both the Constitutional 
Court and the ordinary courts.
in International Military Interventions, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 
Cuenca, 2009. 736.
72 Constitutional Court Decision № 53/1993 (X.13.) ABH [1993] 332. 
73 Constitutional Court Decision № 36/1996 (IX.4.) ABH [1996] 117-121.
74 See for example Supreme Court Bfv.X.1.055/2008/5. Bodnár 1998, 77-84; Hoffmann 
Tamás: A nemzetközi szokásjog szerepe a magyar büntetőbíróságok gyakorlatának tükrében [The 
Role of International Customary Law in the Practice of the Hungarian Criminal Courts] 
Jogelméleti Szemle, 2011/4. http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/hoffmann48.html (accessed on 17.04.2013).
